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WAITING  FOR  THE  JUSTICE  LEAGUE:




Three-year-old Eli Creekmore died at the hands of his father in
spite of robust child welfare agency intervention in his home.  Eli’s
tragic death so thoroughly captured the nation’s attention that a doc-
umentary detailing his troubling story soon followed.1  Daycare work-
ers, a restaurant waitress, and Eli’s grandmother all notified the state
social welfare agency about the appalling physical abuse the toddler
was enduring.2  Even with these reports and his grandmother’s
attempts to rescue him, the child welfare agency kept Eli in his dan-
gerous home where eventually his father beat him to death.3  Bradley
McGee’s death was more of the same.4  Although Bradley had previ-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2013; Bachelor of Arts,
Calvin College, 2003.  I thank Jennifer Mason McAward and Harrison St. Germain for
reading drafts and offering their insights and advice.  I dedicate this Note to my mom,
Susan K. Mulder, for teaching me the value of academic excellence; to my dad, Dale
L. Mulder, for encouraging me to keep writing, dreaming big, and fighting for
change; and to my three amazing children, Chloe, Elijah, and Oliver, for their
unconditional love.
1 See State v. Creekmore, 783 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); THE
UNQUIET DEATH OF ELI CREEKMORE (KCTS/TV 1988) [hereinafter THE UNQUIET
DEATH].  Eli’s father kicked him in the stomach, rupturing the toddler’s bowel, and
then left Eli wedged in the toilet and covered in vomit.  Although Eli’s mom fished
him out and put him to bed, it took the child several lonely hours to die. Creekmore,
783 P.2d at 1072.
2 See THE UNQUIET DEATH, supra note 1.
3 See id.
4 See Barber v. State, 592 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Kim Barker,
Mom in Killing Gets Second Chance, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 19, 2001), http://articles.chicago-
tribune.com/2001-11-19/news/0111190246_1_illinois-child-welfare-agency-bradley-
mcgee-sheryl-hardy; Four Welfare Workers Accused of Failing To Report Child Abuse, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 1, 1989), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-09-01/news/8901090
518_1_report-child-abuse-child-welfare-bradley-mcgee.
523
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ously been in foster care with parents who wanted to adopt him, state
social workers returned Bradley home where his father killed him.
Startlingly, many abused children die in their homes as Eli and Brad-
ley did, even with forceful reporting laws and substantiated reports of
abuse.  These children die even when state welfare agencies are on
notice that the kids are in grave danger.5  Every six hours a child dies
from abuse or neglect in the United States, and child welfare agencies
are monitoring more than forty percent of these children.6
Joshua DeShaney is a child abuse victim whose claims gained
Supreme Court review.7  Although four-year-old Joshua survived mul-
tiple emergency room visits and repeated injuries, his father ulti-
mately beat him so severely that Joshua ended up in a coma.  As a
result of this abuse, Joshua sustained permanent brain damage and
remains profoundly retarded; he has spent the bulk of his life in a
state institution.  The Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices (DSS) file on Joshua commenced when he was just two years old.
Joshua had been under the continuous monitoring of Ann Kemme-
ter, a DSS employee, for more than a year before that final beating.
Joshua’s mother brought a civil rights § 1983 claim8 against DSS argu-
5 See ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, A NATION’S SHAME vii–xiii (1995) available at http://ican-ncfr.org/
documents/Nations-Shame.pdf [hereinafter A NATION’S SHAME] (dedicating report
to “the children on the following list and the thousands not named here, who have
died at the hands of parents or caretakers”—which includes a six-page list of chil-
dren’s names, ages, and causes of death); Natalia Antelava, America’s Child Death
Shame, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
15288865; see also, e.g., Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005); Mar-
tirosyan v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 242 F.3d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 2001);
People v. Santiago, 928 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Associated Press,
Intoxicated Mother Held in Deaths of 2 Unfed Tots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 17,
2004), http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041117/news_1n17deadkids.
html; Erin Einhorn et. al., Desperate Effort in Vain: School Worker Begged ACS to Save
Abused Girl, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_
crime/2008/01/17/2008-01-17_desperate_effort_in_vain_school_worker_b-1.html;
Kareem Fahim, Mother Gets 43 Years in Death of Child, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/nyregion/12nixzmary.html; Carlin DeGuerin
Miller, Murdered 4-Year-Old Girl Had STD; Child Services Did Nothing, Crimesider, CBS
NEWS, Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-5234084-504083.
html.
6 Antelava, supra note 5.
7 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides a cause of action for state actor infringe-
ment of well-established constitutional rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
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ing that the conduct of the social worker—in disregarding obvious
signs of repeated child abuse and in choosing not to save Joshua—had
deprived him of his liberty interest in bodily integrity under the sub-
stantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.9  The Court held that even though DSS was on notice about
the series of beatings and had frequently intervened in Joshua’s fam-
ily, the state agency had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua’s life
from the harm inflicted by his father, a private actor.  According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, the Due Process Clause
does not require the State to provide members of the general public
with adequate protective services.  Only in the case of a special rela-
tionship or a state-created danger would the state have a duty to pro-
tect an individual from private harm.
But can Joshua be fairly categorized as a member of the general
public? The DeShaney opinion acknowledges that the “caseworker
made monthly visits to the DeShaney home, during which she
observed a number of suspicious injuries on Joshua’s head . . . [and]
dutifully recorded these incidents in her files, along with her continu-
ing suspicion that someone in the DeShaney household was physically
abusing Joshua, but she did nothing more.”10  Chief Justice Rehnquist
further mentions several instances where emergency room personnel
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
Id.
Originally, this act was known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and was intended
to protect individual rights in the face of state actors who refused to enforce already
existing laws.  David Pruessner, State-Created Danger Claims, 20 REV. LITIG. 357,
376–379 (2001) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983 supports ready recogni-
tion of certain state-duty claims notwithstanding the private actors involved);see
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (“This act is remedial, and in
aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights.  All statutes and constitu-
tional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently con-
strued. . . .  [T]he largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly
given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect
and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.”) (quoting Rep.
Shellabarger’s comments upon passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871).
Thus, to bring a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the conduct
was committed by a person acting under color of state law, (2) the state actor
deprived the plaintiff of a recognized constitutional right with (3) the requisite state
of mind.  42 U.S.C. § 1983; Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998); see
infra discussion Part IV. and accompanying notes.
9 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
10 Id. at 192–93 (emphasis added).
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called DSS about Joshua’s injuries and notes that on the caseworker’s
final two visits to the DeShaney home she was told that Joshua was too
ill to see her.  “Still, DSS took no action.”11 And yet, the majority opinion
assigns no liability to DSS because the Court did not see Joshua’s situa-
tion as one of state-created danger and did not find that the state’s
intervention gave rise to a special relationship with Joshua.  Indeed,
the Court says of the state actors in this case, “they stood by and did
nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for
them,”12 but this is not enough to establish a constitutional duty.
This Note will argue that although the DeShaney decision devel-
oped a workable legal framework, the Fourteenth Amendment has
more to say about how states protect children from abuse and neglect.
Abused children across the country should have the right to be rea-
sonably protected by child welfare agencies that foreclose all other
would-be rescuers.13  The Court has before carved out very narrow,
special constitutional rules to protect the interests of child abuse vic-
tims,14 and it should do so again. Part I will suggest that the DeShaney
decision did not fully analyze the particular context of child abuse.
Part II will demonstrate that Congress has attempted to improve child
safety via legislation, but that actual improvement has not happened.
Furthermore, an economic analysis cuts in favor of a constitutional
remedy.  Part III will address the DeShaney framework by arguing that
when a child welfare worker intervenes in a family, a special relation-
ship does arise.  Thus, when a welfare agency unreasonably keeps an
abused child in his home, the home becomes a state-maintained and
controlled environment and is—in effect—that child’s prison.  Part IV
will distinguish substantive due process claims from those made in the
procedural due process context, a distinction important both for
determining the threshold state of mind required for culpability and
for shaping the remedies discussion.  This section will argue that
deliberate indifference in the context of a state agency’s special rela-
11 Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
13 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208–09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  “It is a sad commentary
upon American life and constitutional principles.” Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
14 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (ruling that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees a criminal defendant an opportunity for face-to-face confrontation
of a witness against him, unless a victimized child witness would suffer “serious emo-
tional distress such that [she could not] reasonably communicate” if required to tes-
tify face-to-face; such a child may testify via one-way closed-circuit television); see also
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024–25 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
procedures sparing child abuse victims from testifying face-to-face might fall within an
exception to the Confrontation Clause’s general requirements).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 5 31-JAN-13 12:51
2012] waiting  for  the  justice  league 527
tionship to children should trigger § 1983 liability.  Part V will suggest
and defend a narrow due process solution wherein abused children’s
rights to reasonable state protection match prisoners’ rights to the
same.
I. NO DUTY TO PROTECT ABUSED CHILDREN
A. DeShaney’s Workable Framework
In deciding DeShaney, the Court established a workable analytical
framework.15  Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the state is not
“require[d] to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors”16 unless the case falls within two
narrow exceptions:  First, if the state has created the danger, then it
may owe a duty of care to the victim; or second, if the state has a
special relationship to the victim—as it does with prisoners and insti-
tutionalized mental patients—then the state must offer reasonable
protection.17  Thus, DeShaney’s holding embodies a general “no duty”
principle, and the state has no duty to protect citizens like Joshua
from private-party harm.18
DeShaney’s framework is one viable way to analyze Joshua’s claim.
The Court was not convinced that state intervention in a familial child
abuse situation established a special relationship and a corresponding
state duty to complete a reasonable rescue.  Consequently, Justice
Rehnquist found no violation of Joshua’s right to personal security,
even though the right is a “ ‘historic liberty interest’ protected substan-
tively by the Due Process Clause.”19  The relative silence of the opin-
ion suggests that the Court did not consider the amount of control
the state was exerting in the DeShaney family.  The state played a very
active role in Joshua’s family life, and the social worker had nearly
exclusive power to determine Joshua’s living situation.  Such state
15 Although other frameworks can be imagined, such considerations are beyond
the scope of this Note.
16 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
17 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–99, 201 (noting that the Constitution imposes affirm-
ative duties of care on the state arising out of the Eighth Amendment in the prison
context and arising out of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in the
involuntarily-committed mental patient context) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)); see Laura Oren, Safari Into
the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1166–67
(2005).
18 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–99.
19 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
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intervention in the family should trigger special relationship protec-
tions. DeShaney held that the Fourteenth Amendment has nothing to
say about how states care for abused children.  Child welfare agencies,
no matter how negligently or recklessly they execute their tasks, are
not liable for any consequent harms.  Thus, when the inaction of child
welfare agencies keeps abused children trapped in dangerous homes
and those children are severely injured or killed, the Constitution
offers no remedy.
B. The Larger Legal Context of Child Welfare
Perhaps the Court’s decision in DeShaney was not unexpected.20
Courts took a relatively long time to recognize the due process rights
of children in juvenile delinquency proceedings, too, maintaining the
fiction that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights were
“for adults alone.”21  Judges have also been appropriately reluctant to
impinge on parents’ fundamental liberty interests in raising their chil-
dren,22 including the parental right to administer corporal disci-
20 “[DeShaney] is part of a line of decisions in which the [C]ourt has indicated
significant hostility to legal protections for children.”  Editorial, “Poor Joshua!”: The
Supreme Court Absolves States in Child-Abuse Cases, TIME, Mar. 6, 1989,  at 56 (quoting
James Weill of the Children’s Defense Fund) [hereinafter Poor Joshua].
21 Although the first juvenile court was established by the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act of 1899, it was a “social welfare institution” and even minimal due process rights
were not awarded until much later. J. ERIC SMITHBURN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN JUVE-
NILE LAW xxv (2002); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4–5, 13, 28 (1967) (For a prank
phone call and “as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had
stolen a wallet,” the fifteen-year-old petitioner was held in custody and adjudicated as
a delinquent until age 21, without notice or the ability to confront the witnesses
against him, no right to appeal, and no legal representation.  Because the “Due Pro-
cess Clause has a role to play” and “the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court,” the Court held that due process in a juvenile proceeding requires
notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses via cross-examination, the
right not to be a witness against oneself, the right to appellate review, and the right to
a transcript of the proceedings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (hold-
ing that juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury trial in a delinquency proceed-
ing.).  As Justice Douglas has noted: “a mere child” is “an easy victim of the law.” In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 45 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1948)).
22 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (preventing the application of a
visitation statute that may well have served the best interests of the children because
the law “unconstitutionally infringes on parents’ fundamental right to rear their chil-
dren”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evapo-
rate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody
of their child to the State.  Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain
a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. . .”);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a parent’s right to “the
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pline.23  Nevertheless, a parent’s rights over her child are not
absolute.24  Moreover, DeShaney’s legacy is the unworkable state-cre-
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children . . . undeniably
warrants deference, and absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection”);
Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (emphasizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (defining due process liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include “not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children”).
23 In re Ethan H., 609 A.2d 1222, 1226 (N.H. 1992) (favorably citing the “well-
recognized precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the parent of a minor child
or one standing in loco parentis was justified in using a reasonable amount of force
upon a child for the purpose of safe-guarding or promoting the child’s welfare”)
(citations omitted); State v. Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d 1076 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that a father who repeatedly slapped his seventeen-year-old daughter on the face and
punched her could successfully raise a parental discipline justification defense to
child abuse charges); Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d
366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[R]easonable corporal punishment is legal . . . .”).
24 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67  (1944) (“And rights of
parenthood are [not] beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many
other ways . . . the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . .); see, e.g., In re Baby Boy N., 874
P.2d 680 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a state statute permitting termination of
a father’s rights for not financially supporting the mother for six months prior to the
birth of the child and for lack of a developed parent-child relationship survived con-
stitutional muster).  “[T]he degree of protection afforded parental rights under the
Due Process Clause depends upon the extent and nature of the parent-child relation-
ship.” Id. at 688; In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d 844 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that,
notwithstanding Troxel, if a child has been removed from her home and is in state
custody, her right to visit with her siblings can overcome the parent’s objection); In re
E.A.T., 989 P.2d 860, 864 (Mont. 1999) (holding that a mother who allowed her child
to be sodomized forfeited her parental rights, for the policy of preservation of family
unity should not come at “the expense of the child’s best interest”).  Furthermore,
“[t]he right to maintain the family unit is not absolute and although the children’s
best interests and welfare generally are served by maintaining the family unit with
custody retained by the natural parents, the children’s best interest and welfare, not that of
the natural parent, is the paramount consideration.” Id. (quoting In re C.G., 747 P.2d 1369,
1371 (Mont. 1988)); In re T. H. L., 636 P.2d 330, 334 (Okla. 1981) (“The interest of
children in a wholesome environment has a constitutional dimension no less compel-
ling than that the parents have in the preservation of family integrity.  In the hierar-
chy of constitutionally protected values both interests rank as fundamental and must
hence be shielded with equal vigor and solicitude.” (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 633 (1979) (holding that a mature minor has the right to obtain an abortion
without parental obstruction, and that “[a] child, merely on account of his minority,
is not beyond the protection of the Constitution  . . . .”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“Students in school as well as out of school
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ated danger doctrine and thoroughly muddled circuit tests.25  In the
twenty-three years since the decision, DeShaney has foreclosed § 1983
claims in many child abuse cases with robust state agency involve-
ment.26  And, child abuse deaths continue to rise in America.27
Abused children continue to die daily under watchful state agency
care.  The public is always suitably outraged, and yet those agencies
statutorily obligated to intervene are not liable when they fail.28
Because of DeShaney, this system is unlikely to change.  In 1989,
“[g]overnment child welfare agencies expressed relief over the
are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.  They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect  . . . .”)); see also Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1358 (1980) (stating that although it is “well
established” post In re Gault that the Constitution protects children, how much pro-
tection the Constitution affords minors remains an open question).
 Today, robust parental rights are the presumption, but the unique circum-
stances raised in child abuse situations militate recognition of the child’s right to be
reasonably protected by the state when the state agency has knowledge of abuse. See
Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“We do not terminate [parental] rights
to punish a parent, but to protect a child.”).
25 Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 26
(2007) (“One would think, given the large volume of litigation in this area and the
splits among the circuits that the Supreme Court would have stepped in. . . .  And I
think it is a scenario where we do need the Supreme Court.  It is about due process,
an area where we need a national, uniform set of rules.”); see also Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (stare decisis analysis should query
“whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability”).
26 See J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Doe v. Dist. of Colum-
bia., 93 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing DeShaney to summarily foreclose a simi-
lar substantive due process claim brought on behalf of a severely-burned two-year-old
against social workers who failed to protect her notwithstanding multiple reports of
abuse and neglect); Milburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 871 F.2d 474,
475–76 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying recovery to a child severely abused in foster care with
injuries including a broken tibia, a deep laceration over his eye, and severely burned
and permanently disfigured hands and wrists; in spite of four hospital visits and hospi-
tal personnel reporting abuse in writing and via telephone to child welfare agents, the
state agency that failed to investigate was not liable, because DeShaney “is dispositive”).
But see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
27 In 1998 about three children per day died from abuse in the United States; in
2010, six children died from abuse every day. National Child Abuse Statistics, Child Abuse
in America CHILDHELP.ORG, http://www.childhelp.org/pages/statistics; see also ADMIN.
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NAT’L
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4) 3–11 (2008) (showing the
increase in child abuse fatalities from approximately 1100 in 1986 to about 1500 in
1993 to an estimated 2400 in 2006, as well as noting that this increase is statistically
significant; of course, even preservation of the status quo would be problematic)
[hereinafter NIS-4].
28 State tort law claims are inadequate for various reasons. See infra Parts IV–V.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 9 31-JAN-13 12:51
2012] waiting  for  the  justice  league 531
[DeShaney] decision” because “‘[a] contrary ruling would have seri-
ously affected programs and budgetary priorities.’”29 Certainly, a con-
trary decision would have necessitated reform.  In 1990, child abuse
was declared a “national emergency” and “a moral disaster” because
the rise in reported cases was “astronomical”30 even then.31  Today the
trend continues.32  If constitutional rights were protected and liability
were appropriately assigned, necessary policy change would likely fol-
low.33  Now is the time for the Court to exercise “reasoned judgment”
to rework how such claims are treated.34
II. THE CURRENT CHILD WELFARE REGIME
The facts of the DeShaney case and so many child abuse cases raise
the question: Why do child protection workers choose not to inter-
29 “Poor Joshua!”, supra note 20, at 54 (quoting Benna Ruth Solomon of the State
and Local Legal Center in Washington).
30 See Marlene Cimons, Panel Calls Child Abuse a National Emergency, L.A. TIMES
(June 27, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-27/news/mn-679_1_child-abuse
-cases (“The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, using unusually strong
language, condemned the current system in the United States as failing to protect the
nation’s children.”).
31 U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH & HUMAN
SERVS., ABUSE AND NEGLECT xiii, 1 (1990) (“Within each State, not only the integrity of
CPS, but that of the entire system of services to children and families has been
threatened by the enormous increase in the number of reports without a commensu-
rate increase in resources.”) [hereinafter ABUSE AND NEGLECT]. “Not only are child
abuse and neglect wrong, but the nation’s lack of an effective response to them is also
wrong. Neither can be tolerated. Together, they constitute a moral disaster. . . . All
Americans should be outraged by child maltreatment.” Id. at viii.
32 See supra notes 5, 27.
33 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212–14
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “sterile formalism” of the majority
and lamenting “Poor Joshua!  Victim of repeated attacks . . . and abandoned by
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned
what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except . . . ‘dutifully record[ ] these
incidents in [their] files’” (quoting id. at 193 (majority opinion)).
34 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The
inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.’”); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 171–172 (1952) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment
could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or
thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a
function for inanimate machines and not for judges.”).  “The doctrine of stare decisis is
essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of
the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577 (2003).
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vene in situations like Joshua’s?  Although arguably DSS did establish
a special relationship in DeShaney, the prior issue is the social worker’s
choosing to keep Joshua in his dangerous home in spite of chroni-
cling abuse “in detail that seems almost eerie in light of her failure to
act upon it.”35  As it turns out, abused children are at the mercy of a
unique interplay among statutory law, longstanding child welfare poli-
cies, and routine state-agency practices.  By relieving states of liability,
the DeShaney decision only adds to a pre-existing problem, and the
Court’s unwillingness to assign economic liability to these state agen-
cies sustains the ill-functioning child welfare regime.  Today, federal
law requires that these agencies act in the best interests of the child.36
When states fail to act reasonably on this federal mandate, liability
should follow.
A. Preserving Abusive Families Disregards the Fundamental
Rights of Children
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of
198037 required state agencies to make “reasonable efforts” to “pre-
vent or eliminate the [removal of the child from his home], and to
make it possible for the child to . . . return to [his] home.”38
Although requiring “reasonable efforts” at family preservation seems
an appropriate mandate on its face, as applied, AACWA resulted in
family preservation at all costs—even at the cost of a child’s life.  In
Joshua’s case, the goal of preserving his family gave primary animation
to the social worker’s actions.  Similarly, in Eli Creekmore’s case, the
Homebuilders program—“Intensive Family Preservation Service and
Intensive Family Reunification Services”—was trying to keep Eli’s fam-
ily together in spite of the many reports of abuse made by emergency
room personnel, daycare providers, and family members.  Ultimately,
family preservation meant that Eli died in his home.39
35 Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36 See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
37 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
The definition of “reasonable” was left to the individual states; DSS worker Ann Kem-
meter’s extensive notes in Joshua DeShaney’s case reflect the federal reporting
requirements.  LYNNE CURRY, THE DESHANEY CASE 57 (2007).
38 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(B) (2006).
39 See supra note 1; see also Programs for Intensive Family Preservation and Family
Reunification, INST. FOR FAMILY DEV., http://www.institutefamily.org/programs_IFPS.
asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (describing the Homebuilders mission: “Homebuilders
provides intensive, in-home crisis intervention, counseling, and life-skills education
for families who have children at imminent risk of placement in state-funded care”).
The website refers to children in “imminent danger of being placed in foster, group,
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Under the AACWA family preservation model, “caseworkers
served as intermediaries between their clients and the network of
social services provided by the states.  Significantly . . . caseworkers
undertook responsibility for all members of the household rather
than the children exclusively.”40  In this regime, the so-called “child
welfare workers” were actually family welfare workers who played a
dual role: first, the primary “healer” of the family who needed to gain
the trust of the parents; and second, the state authority figure respon-
sible for protecting children and removing abused and neglected chil-
dren from their dangerous homes.41  Not only were these two roles in
basic conflict with one another, these conflicted caseworkers were the
very persons responsible for initiating child protection actions—all
reports of suspected abuse “were routed to the child protective worker
assigned to the family involved.”42  Additionally, if the social worker
rescued a child from an abusive home, the child’s respite was gener-
ally temporary, as the social worker would then focus all efforts on
family reunification.43
In Joshua’s case, the social worker, Ann Kemmeter, developed a
“family plan” pursuant to the statute—not a “Joshua safety plan.”
Kemmeter tried to help Joshua’s abusive dad, Randy DeShaney, find a
job, she counseled Randy’s wife on how to care for children, and she
recommended that Joshua go to Head Start.44  Even when the family
did  not uphold their end of the voluntary social service agreement
with DSS—Randy was still out of work, injuries continued to appear
on Joshua’s body, and Joshua was not enrolled in Head Start—the
social worker merely noted that Joshua seemed unusually accident-
prone.45  Kemmeter acted under AACWA to save Joshua’s family, but
in the process gravely endangered him.  As DeShaney illustrates, some
families are emphatically not worth saving, and AACWA’s family pres-
ervation regime needed to change.
or institutional care” but does not recognize the “imminent danger” of permanent
injury and death many of these children face, stating: “The goal of the program is to
remove the risk of harm to the child instead of removing the child.” See Antelava,
supra note 5 (noting that Texas brags that it has the highest family preservation
record in the United States, but misses the point that it has the highest rate of child
abuse deaths in the United States).
40 CURRY, supra note 37, at 7 (discussing the conflict inherent in abruptly chang-




43 RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID 125–43 (1996).
44 CURRY, supra note 37, at 23.
45 Id. at 26–27.
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B. Congress’s Passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Has
Not Made Children Safer
In part because of highly publicized cases like Eli Creekmore’s,46
Adam Mann’s,47 and Joshua DeShaney’s, Congress passed the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act (ASFA) in 1997.48  This new law sought to
clarify the reasonable efforts requirement of AACWA to emphasize
that “in making such reasonable efforts, the child’s health and safety shall
be the paramount concern.”49  Although child welfare is now statutorily
46 See supra notes 1–2.  “Eli Creekmore was killed by his father in 1986, and Child
Protective Services (CPS) involvement in the case is a major reason it made headlines.
CPS had removed Eli from his home three times in two years, but returned him each
time despite evidence his father continued to abuse him.  [CPS] concluded Eli’s
caseworkers made no major errors in handling his case.  Instead, [CPS] officials said
the ‘system’ failed Eli, and recommended changes in law and policy.”  Linda Shaw,
Settlement Reached in Suit Over Eli Creekmore Death, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 10, 1990), http:/
/community. seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19901010&slug=1097503.
47 A NATION’S SHAME, supra note 5, at xxiu (“In 1991, a riveting PBS documentary
told the story of the brutal death of malnourished 5-year-old Adam Mann, beaten to
death . . . by his stepfather . . . with participation by his mother . . . . Many profession-
als had missed a series of red flags that Adam was in serious danger. The autopsy of
Adam revealed over 100 injuries on his body. Following the autopsy, the cause of
death was listed as a broken skull, broken ribs, and a split liver. At one time or
another, nearly every bone in his body had been broken. In addition, there was no
food in his stomach.”) (citations omitted).
48 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116. (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)).
49 Id. (emphasis added).  “The new legislation marks a fundamental shift in child-
welfare philosophy, away from a presumption that everything should be done to reu-
nite children with their birth parents, even if the parents have been abusive.  The
legislation would instead give more weight to the child’s health and safety.”  Katha-
rine Q. Seelye, Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adop
tion.html; see ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ADOPTION AND OTHER PERMANENCY OUTCOMES FOR
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 13–14 (2005), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/congress_adopt/congress_adopt.pdf (discussing key legislation
including AACWA and ASFA).
Although the foster care system is beyond the scope of this Note, states are gener-
ally exposed to greater liability when they put children in foster care, which may give
rise to a special relationship or a state-created danger claim.  DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (“[W]hen the state takes a
person into its custody . . . the Constitution imposes . . . a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”).  “After DeShaney,
many of our sister Courts of Appeals held that foster children have a substantive due
process right to be free from harm at the hands of state-regulated foster parents.”
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that foster care custody
falls within the special relationship exception to DeShaney, but that the state actor did
not act with the requisite culpability to be held liable under § 1983 (citing e.g., Lintz
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required to be the supreme consideration, child abuse and neglect
deaths continue to rise and family preservation and reunification
efforts often persist in the face of abuse.50  ASFA, a federal statute
which attempts to prevent the sort of abuse that Joshua experienced,
has not achieved reform.  In spite of ASFA and its state counterparts,51
more than a decade after the passage of ASFA, the on-the-ground
approach of social workers likely has not changed much.52
Not only is it the child welfare worker’s job to initiate interven-
tion, but also the “buck effectively stop[s] with the [d]epartment.”53
v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th Cir. 1994); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d
883, 891–93 (10th Cir. 1992); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848–49 (7th Cir. 1990))).
In any event, DeShaney incentivizes social workers to leave children in dangerous
homes where liability does not attach; thus, a fear of liability may be animating child
welfare agencies’ reluctance to place abused kids in foster care, as well as a concern
about liability for infringing parental due process rights. See supra note 22; GELLES,
supra note 43, at 150.
50 National Child Abuse Statistics, Child Abuse in America, CHILDHELP.ORG, http://
www.childhelp.org/pages/statistics#gen-stats (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
51 See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 1039-b (McKinney 2009); N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2009) (“The legislature recognizes that the health
and safety of children is of paramount importance. To the extent it is consistent with
the health and safety of the child, the legislature further hereby finds that . . . the
state’s first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to
reunite it if the child has already left home . . . .”).  Thus, the New York ASFA statute
retains a conflict: children’s health is of “paramount importance,” but the state’s “first
obligation” is to preserve the family.
52 See Antelava, supra note 5 (noting that “America has the worst child abuse
record in the industrialised world,” and that “Unicef research from 2001 places the
US equal bottom with Mexico on child deaths from maltreatment”); see also Terri
Langford, Mom Goes to Trial in 4-Year-Old’s Death in Harris County, HOUS. CHRON. (June
28, 2010), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Mom-goes-to-trial-in-
4-year-old-s-death-in-Harris-1695835.php (In Emma’s case, a visit to the emergency
room with a super-glued head and a subsequent case of genital herpes were not
enough to warrant removing her from her abusive home.  “Emma—a sexually abused
child found with 80 bruises, a severed pancreas and fractured skull—died on June 27,
2009 . . . .  Three weeks before Emma died, her pediatrician notified Texas Child
Protective Services that she had tested positive for genital herpes, a sexually transmit-
ted disease.”); Randy Burton, CPS Under Fire in Death of Emma Thompson, HOUS.
CHRON. (August 15, 2009), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/CPS-
under-fire-in-death-of-Emma-Thompson-1746858.php (describing the Texas Health
and Human Services Inspector General’s report, which found that CPS only removed
children from abusive homes twenty-seven percent of the time).
53 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see GELLES, supra note 43,
at 9 (The [child welfare] system . . . [is] just as responsible . . . as the actual
perpetrator.”).
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As was undoubtedly true in Joshua’s case,54 reporting abuse is gener-
ally not the weakest link; rather, the system still fails—post-ASFA—
when social workers view a family’s compliance with a misguided fam-
ily preservation plan as an indication that the home environment can
become safe, all the while actively keeping children in their dangerous
homes.55  Up to 40% of abused children die under the care of a child
welfare agency,56 and the legal regime is such that only “specialized
state agents in child welfare agencies” have the power to protect
abused children.57
C. Economic Considerations Support Reform
Congress indicated that it agreed that the priority is the health
and safety of children with its passage of ASFA, and when child wel-
fare agencies do not reasonably carry out Congress’s stated statutory
purpose, assigning liability makes sense.  But assigning liability also
makes cents.   That is, economic arguments actually cut in favor of
imposing liability on child welfare agencies.  Problematically,
“DeShaney together with DSS’s statutory immunity has effectively elimi-
nated any liability considerations that might have encouraged the
State to allocate its resources more efficiently.”  After all, the “finan-
cial penalty” of paying for Joshua’s care in a state-run institution actu-
ally continues to be assessed to a state agency—just not to DSS.58  At
the very least, efficiency is lacking here.
Furthermore, society at large pays a steep price for turning a
blind eye toward victimized children.59  The indirect costs of child
abuse include increased societal spending due to the resulting long-
54 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing reports made by
Randy DeShaney’s second wife, police, three separate emergency room personnel
reports, neighbors, and the social worker, whose careful records of the reports “seems
almost eerie in light of her failure to act upon it”).
55 See GELLES, supra note 43, at 9–10, 86, 88 (1996).
56 Antelava, supra note 5.
57 See CURRY, supra note 37, at 87.
58 Garrett M. Smith, Note, DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of
Constitutional Torts, 49 MD. L. REV. 484, 506–07 & n.142 (1990) (“State[s] would have
much to gain if [they] instituted a more effective prevention program because the
program’s benefits would outweigh both the economic costs of funding and the likely
social costs of ignoring child abuse. . . .  [L]iability could increase the efficiency of
inefficient state programs.” (citations omitted)).  A cost-benefit analysis of state liabil-
ity in child abuse situations would likely lead to better allocation of state resources
among agencies and yield “financial and social benefits.” Id.
59 DAVID S. ZIELINSKI, LONG-TERM SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 2005), available at http://familyimpactseminars.
org/s_nmfis02c03.pdf.
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term problems, including impaired physical and mental health, sub-
stance abuse, criminality, incarceration, and teenage pregnancy.60
Child abuse victims require additional educational support and medi-
cal intervention and as adults are more than twice as likely to fall
below the federal poverty line; moreover, since child abuse victims are
generally less economically productive, they more often must rely on
Medicaid and state unemployment insurance.61  Society is already pay-
ing for child abuse but is doing so in a dramatically inefficient fashion
and at great cost to children.62  In fact, the annual indirect costs of
child abuse in America amount to at least $70.7 billion.63  Thus,
exposing child welfare agencies to liability is not only the statute-sanc-
tioned choice, but it is the economically beneficial choice, too.
At least one scholar disagrees.  In her analysis of DeShaney, Bar-
bara Armacost64 argued that DeShaney was rightly decided because of
both economic and separation-of-powers concerns.65  Armacost
asserted that “[t]he level of protection that the government plausibly
can provide is determined, in large part, by the amount of resources
the legislature has allocated to particular services.  Permitting individ-
uals to bring failure-to-protect claims would require the courts to
review resource-allocation decisions and permit judges to mandate a
level of protection different from the level determined by the political
branches.”66  Separation-of-powers concerns might have been a
thorny issue when DeShaney was decided because AACWA demanded
family preservation even above the best interests of the child.  Thus,
the Supreme Court would have been somewhat hard-pressed to assign
liability to an agency that was at least arguably complying with the
60 Id. at 19; see CHING-TUNG WANG & JOHN HOLTON, TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.
preventchildabuse.org/about_us/media_releases/pcaa_pew_economic_impact_study
_final.pdf.
61 ZIELINSKI, supra note 59, at 18–20.
62 WANG & HOLTON, supra note 60, at 2 “[I]t is impossible to calculate the impact
of the pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life that victims of child abuse and neg-
lect experience. These ‘intangible losses’, though difficult to quantify in monetary
terms, are real and should not be overlooked.  Intangible losses, in fact, may
represent the largest cost component of violence against children . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
63 Id. at 5 (cost calculated in 2007 dollars).
64 Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 983 (1996).
65 Id. at 1002 (“[T]he primary driving force behind DeShaney . . . may not be
constitutional text or history but . . . permitting liability for inadequate protection
would make the courts the arbiters of decisions about how to allocate finite public
resources and manpower that are best left to the political branches.”).
66 Id. at 1002–03.
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congressional mandate, albeit unreasonably.  But today, ASFA
demands that state agencies protect the child’s best interests first.  If
agencies are demonstrably not doing so, judicial intervention is appro-
priate.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the argument that states estab-
lish special relationships with children in child welfare cases,
Armacost’s economic argument disregards the fundamental nature of
the rights at stake and the importance—even economically—of
preventing and deterring child abuse.  Although it is undeniably true
that “[p]ublic outrage at child abusers [is] not accompanied by an
equally enthusiastic opening of its pocketbooks to adequately staff and
maintain quality alternative living arrangements for . . . young vic-
tims,”67 this sort of argument unacceptably justifies states in routinely
and dramatically underfunding child welfare agencies.68  Finally, eco-
nomic interests are better served by assigning liability appropriately,
thereby preventing the cascade of costs that follows from permitting
unreasonable state agency conduct to continue unchecked.
III. AN ABUSED CHILD’S HOME IS LIKE A PRISON TO HER69
A. Wronging the Rights in the Circuits
DeShaney did highlight two narrow exceptions to the general no-
duty rule: the state-created danger exception and the special relation-
ship exception.  Neither exception applied in Joshua’s case.70  Years
before Joshua’s case reached Supreme Court review, however, the
Court in Martinez v. California71 had flagged the possibility that a spe-
cial relationship between the state and a plaintiff might create a right
to state protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.72  As a result,
67 CURRY, supra note 37, at 59.
68 Many § 1983 cases grant that the child’s constitutional rights have been
infringed but decide the case on qualified immunity grounds. See Lawrence G.
Albrecht, Human Rights Paradigms for Remedying Governmental Child Abuse, 40 WASH-
BURN L.J. 447 (2001) (writing persuasively on the human rights issues these cases pre-
sent); see also supra note 24 and Shaw, supra note 46 In the aftermath of the
Creekmore case, the investigation into CPS determined that changes in law and pol-
icy were necessary).
69 Professor J. Eric Smithburn first suggested this method of analysis to me. See
also Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359,
1361–62 (1992) (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 199–200 (1989) (DSS “by the affirmative exercise of its power” restrained
Joshua’s liberty and failed to meet his “basic human need” for safety).
70 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–201.
71 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
72 Id. at 284–85 (The state released a parolee who five months later tortured and
killed the plaintiff.  Although the plaintiff lost on proximate causation grounds, the
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in pre-DeShaney decisions the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits
explicitly acknowledged that a substantive due process right to reason-
able protection was a living thing.73  In Estate of Bailey v. County of
York,74 for example, the child welfare agency had custody of an abused
five-year-old, Aleta, and returned her to her mother and her mother’s
boyfriend, against doctor’s advice, agency procedures, and without
adequate investigation.  The court ruled that Aleta had a viable § 1983
claim75 reasoning: “When the agency knows that a child has been
beaten, ‘[t]his strengthens the argument that some sort of special
relationship had been established.’”76  Since the DeShaney Court failed
to recognize a special relationship in Joshua’s case and upset77 child
welfare progress within the circuits, § 1983 plaintiffs looked instead to
the state-created danger exception.
Court left the possibility open that the state may owe a duty to plaintiffs with whom it
has a special relationship).
73 See Estate of Bailey v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194–96 (4th Cir. 1984) (dismissing the § 1983 actions of two
minor children—a seven-month-old and a three-year-old beaten to death by their
guardians—against a state child protection agency based on qualified immunity; in
doing so the court explicitly recognized a Fourteenth Amendment right to protection
from the state: “for [Martinez v. California and Fox v. Custis] firmly established that a
right of affirmative protection could arise under the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment. . . .”); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
right to state protection could “arise out of special custodial or other relationships”);
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (observing that although “there is
no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by
criminals or madmen,” and “[t]he Constitution is a charter of negative liberties,” the
state still can be liable for the actions of private tortfeasors when the state places a
person in known danger and fails to protect him); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1979) (police officers who arrested the driver of a car and abandoned the
three minor children to the dangers of traffic and cold weather exhibited gross negli-
gence giving rise to viable § 1983 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment).
74 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 510–511 (quoting Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11).
77 The Court noted that Martinez v. California has led “[s]everal of the Courts of
Appeals” to rule that “once the State learns that a third party poses a special danger to
an identified victim, and indicates its willingness to protect the victim against that
danger, a ‘special relationship’ arises between State and victim, giving rise to an
affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to render adequate
protection.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.4
(citing Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510–11 and Jensen, 747 F.2d at 190–94 & n.11).
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B. The State-Created Danger Exception Closes the Due Process Door78
Post-DeShaney, plaintiffs have been fruitlessly chasing the state-cre-
ated danger exception to the no-duty rule.79  Under this exception,
only if the state had created the danger, would it have a correspond-
ing duty to protect the citizen from harm.80  A DeShaney footnote fur-
ther suggests that if the state affirmatively exercises its power to place
an individual in a dangerous situation, “we might have a situation suf-
ficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect.”81  Since this exception is merely
implied in dicta, much inter- and intra-circuit court variation exists in
the acknowledgement and application of this doctrine.82  In short, no
78 THE SOUND OF MUSIC Rogers & Hammerstein 1965) Fraulein Maria: “When the
Lord closes a door, somewhere he opens a window”).
79 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. See Oren, supra note 17, at 1166–67.
80 Oren, supra note 17, at 1166–67.  This exception did not apply in Joshua’s
case: “While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him
any more vulnerable to them.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
81 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
82 Circuit confusion closes the window:  Of the circuits that apply the doctrine,
each frames the analysis distinctly. Oren, supra note 17 at 1184.  The Second Circuit
applies a two-part test and requires that the liberty deprivation by a state actor
“shock[ ] the conscious.”  Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d
415, 431 (2d Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit has adopted a four-part test and requires a
plaintiff to prove “willful disregard” on the part of the state actor.  Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1208–09 (3d Cir. 1996).  The Sixth Circuit has a three-prong test.  Jones
v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006).  The Seventh Circuit has its own three-
element analysis.  Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (The state
action must be at least “reckless”).  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have explicitly
found cognizable state-created danger claims. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52,
54–55 (8th Cir. 1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589–90 (9th Cir. 1989).  The
Tenth Circuit has established a rigorous six-part analysis including the requirement
that state conduct “shocks the conscience.”  Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,
1251 (10th Cir. 2008).
 In stark contrast, the First and Fourth Circuits still do not recognize the doc-
trine.  J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphatically reinforcing
DeShaney’s no-duty rule); Velez-Diaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71, 80 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“‘This court has . . . discussed the state created danger theory but never found it
actionable . . . .’” (quoting Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2005)));
Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (“This Court has consistently
read DeShaney to require a custodial context before any affirmative duty can arise
under the Due Process Clause.”). But see supra notes 73, 77 (the Fourth Circuit pre-
DeShaney recognized the state’s duty to protect in special relationship cases).  The
Fifth Circuit also has resisted recognition of the doctrine. See Hernandez ex rel. Her-
nandez v. Texas Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs., No. 3:99-CV-1654-P, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22707, at *7 (N.D. Texas 2002), rev’d 380 F.3d 872, 880 n.1 (5th Cir.
2004) (“We note that the district court also alluded to the plaintiffs’ stating a theory
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two circuits employ the same test, and even if plaintiffs get past the
substantial hurdle of filing a well-pleaded complaint, these claims
have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful.  “At first, [the state-created
danger doctrine] seemed a hopeful development” but “the situation
looks far bleaker today.  The more recent cases in the courts of
appeals rarely survive dismissal, much less summary judgment.”83  In
fact, “no series of cases . . . are more consistently depressing than the
state-created danger decisions.”84  It is true that outside of the child
abuse context, DeShaney’s state-created danger theory has—on rare
occasions—been legally cognizable.85  Yet, “[i]t is not clear, under
DeShaney, how large a role the state must play in the creation of dan-
ger and in the creation of vulnerability before it assumes a corre-
sponding constitutional duty to protect.”86  Ultimately, “the fate of
state-created danger cases has been disheartening.”87
of liability based on a state-created danger claim.  We emphasize that our court has
not yet determined whether a state official has a similar duty to protect individuals
from state-created dangers.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit seems to have overruled itself and now repudiates the doctrine.  White v.
Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen someone not in custody
is harmed because too few resources were devoted to their safety and protection, that
harm will seldom, if ever, be cognizable under the Due Process Clause.”) (explicitly
overruling Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 354–55 (11th Cir.
1989)).  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 3 (“Notably, some circuits, like the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits, tend to combine the two exceptions in DeShaney.”); Christo-
pher R. Burge, Texas Advance Directives Act Versus “State-Created Danger” Theory: A Prima
Facie Analysis, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 557, 559–60 (2009) (“[T]he precise require-
ments for a state-created danger action are still somewhat hazy.  The elements for a
prima facie claim vary among the majority of the federal circuits, and the First,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have exceptionally limited interpretations for personal
injury claims against government officials following the DeShaney decision.” (footnotes
omitted)).
83 Laura Oren, Some Thoughts on the State-Created Danger Doctrine, DeShaney is Still
Wrong and Castle Rock is More of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 48–49
& n.11–12 (2006) (“[In recent cases] only two out of twenty-one appellate cases sur-
vived the state-created danger screening.”).
84 Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 1.
85 See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that police
officers could be liable for creating danger when they impounded a woman’s vehicle
and abandoned her in a high-crime area and the woman was subsequently raped);
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 53–54 (8th Cir. 1990) (Police officers could be
liable for their failure to “take seriously” a woman’s demands for enforcement of a
restraining order; moreover, the officers took “affirmative action” increasing the “vul-
nerability of  [the] decedents.”).
86 Ferguson, 911 F.2d at 55.
87 Oren, supra note 83, at 57.
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C. The Special Relationship Doctrine Should Open a Window
The struggle in the circuits highlights that DeShaney’s state-cre-
ated danger exception remains elusive.  Moreover, the doctrine does
not squarely fit the child abuse context, and the Supreme Court has
recently refused to elucidate further.88  In stark contrast, the special
relationship doctrine has long been legally cognizable and has already
been logically extended to cover the foster care context.89  The
DeShaney Court allowed: “[W]hen the State takes a person into its cus-
tody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon
it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well-being.”90  Although DeShaney itself looks to foreclose the
special relationship argument outside of actual custody situations, the
DeShaney opinion did not really analyze the specific context of child
abuse and the amount of state action occurring within families like
Joshua’s.  According to DeShaney, the state’s knowledge of the “indi-
vidual’s predicament” and “expressions of intent to help” are never
enough to give rise to the state’s affirmative duty to protect.91  Apply-
ing this principle, the Court held that even though the state had
Joshua in custody at one point, by returning him to his father, “it
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have
been had [the State] not acted at all; the State does not become the
permanent guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered
him shelter.”92
88 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Breen v. Southerland, 2007 WL
2155535 (5th Cir. July 23, 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007).
89 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (recognizing that the Eighth
Amendment establishes “the government’s obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”); see infra note 100.
90 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989) (emphasis added) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)).
91 Id. at 200.
92 Id. at 201.  The Court blatantly ignores the elephant in the room: tort law
regarding rescue.  Tort law imposes no duty to rescue, but once a rescue is under-
taken it may not be negligently or recklessly carried out: “One who, being under no
duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect
himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by (a) the
failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while
within the actor’s charge, or (b) the actor’s discontinuing his aid or protection, if by
so doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of
him.”  Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of Finding No State Action, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 95, 103 (1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324
(1965)).  Blumoff further demonstrates that comment g to this section explains
324(b)’s “worse position” this way: “If the actor has succeeded in removing the other
from a position of danger to one of safety, he cannot change his position for the
worse by unreasonably putting him back into the same peril, or into a new one.  Thus,
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Nevertheless, the state agency exercised great power over
Joshua’s environment—the very environment that facilitated Joshua’s
grave injuries.  The Court nods to the tort law of nonfeasance, but if
the Court were to appropriately compare the DeShaney facts to the tort
law regime, it would acknowledge that this is not a failure to rescue
case; this is a botched rescue case.  DSS began the process of rescuing
Joshua, but failed to complete the rescue in a reasonable manner.
Thus, because DSS executed AACWA’s demands so unreasonably,
Joshua should have had a viable special relationship claim.  Today,
under the ASFA regime, which gives primacy to the best interests of
the child, abused children should certainly have a viable special rela-
tionship claim when state agencies initiate rescue and then fail to do
so reasonably—in contravention to Congress’s statutory mandate.
Further, child welfare agencies are statutorily required to
respond to reports of abuse;93 when the agency substantiates an abuse
report and intervenes in a family, the agency is controlling the living
arrangements of the abused child, and such state intervention in the
sacred realm of the family94 should trigger the special relationship
due process protections.  Just as foster home placement must be rea-
sonable and safe and gives rise to a special relationship, the decision
not to place a child in a foster home must likewise be reasonable and
safe.95  That is, “if [the state] choose[s] not to decide, [it] still [has]
made a choice.”96  In DeShaney, Justice Rehnquist stated that it is “the
State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom” that
“trigger[s] the protections of the Due Process Clause. . . .”97  Here the
while A, who has taken B from a trench filled with poisonous gas, does not here
obligate himself to pay for B’s treatment in a hospital, he cannot throw him back into
the same trench, or leave him lying in the street where he may be run over.” Id. at
104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. g (1965)).  According to
Blumoff, the DeShaney opinion “miss[es] the point.” Id. The Court’s use of “worse
position” is error because the Restatement indicates that the “no worse position” man-
date “must mean . . . ‘no worse than the best position the rescuer achieved after the
recuse effort began.’” Id. Thus, the state actors in DeShaney indeed put Joshua in a
worse position because “[t]he [DSS] ‘threw Joshua back into the trench.’” Id. at 105.
93 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 415 (McKinney 2009).
94 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.
1992) (the Tenth Circuit recognized a clearly established constitutional right to a
reasonably secure foster home placement).
96 RUSH, “Freewill,” on PERMANENT WAVES (lyrics by Neil Peart 1980).
97 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (discussing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982) (holding the state has an affirmative duty to protect involuntarily committed
mental patients) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding the state has an
affirmative duty to treat an inmate’s medical needs)). Id. at 201 (asserting “[t]he
Estelle-Youngberg analysis simply has no applicability in [Joshua’s] case”).
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DeShaney opinion does not recognize the prison-like, involuntary-cus-
tody context of the state-monitored child abuse situation.  Both statu-
tory law and agency practices contribute to a contextual prison every
bit as restraining and real to the child as a physical prison would be.
Because the Court fixated on the notion of a physical, four-walled cus-
tody situation, it avoided finding a special relationship in Joshua’s
case.
The Court should have queried exactly how an abused child
could ever voluntarily escape his abuser.  Even others who want to res-
cue the child—like grandparents, teachers, or doctors—must content
themselves with reporting abuse to the state agency.  Unlike adult vic-
tims of violence, a child cannot obtain a restraining order or leave the
premises to escape abuse.  Since the social worker in Joshua’s case was
doing all possible to keep Joshua’s family together, Joshua’s house was
certainly more like a prison than the “free world” invoked by Justice
Rehnquist.  And the state actively maintained Joshua in that abuse-
prison, depriving him of his fundamental liberty interest to be “free of
physical and emotional violence at the hands of his . . . most trusted
caretaker.”98
Ironically, Joshua has more due process rights now—in a state
institution for the profoundly retarded—than he ever had as a healthy
child.99  Since the state was actively involved in monitoring Joshua’s
situation, the Court should have recognized a special relationship that
gave rise to the state’s constitutional duty to protect.100 “Having set
the trap, through its monopolization of child protection in the hands
of a social service agency . . . the state may not be excused from consti-
tutional accountability on the pretext that the abusive parent formally
retained custody and therefore sprung the trap by himself.”101  When
98 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Padg-
ett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991) (the
Florida Supreme Court recognizes the fundamental liberty interest of a child to be
free from physical and emotional violence) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754
n.7 (1982) (recognizing the “liberty interests of the child”)); See Lang v. Starke Cnty.
Office of Families and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
99 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
100 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05 (establishing that by virtue of the special relationship
between the state and a prisoner, the Eighth Amendment requires the state provide
adequate medical treatment); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315–16 (“If it is cruel and unu-
sual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be uncon-
stitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—
in unsafe conditions.”).  This reasoning by Justice Powell applies squarely to the situa-
tion of abused children.
101 Laura Oren, The State’s Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 731 (1990); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
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the state welfare agency enters into the family and substantiates a
report of abuse, a constitutional duty to protect should be triggered.
Children in the child welfare system are particularly voiceless.102
Even more so than mental patients and prisoners, the child’s life and
bodily integrity are so restrained that the child victim does not know
that something has gone wrong and the state agency is the only res-
cuer with access.103  “[C]hild welfare agencies bear almost the com-
plete responsibility for investigating child abuse,”104 and in the
DeShaney case it did not help that police officers, doctors, nurses, and
neighbors continued to dutifully report abuse, because all reports
stopped with DSS.  As in the prison context, the state “blocked all ave-
nues of escape” and forced Joshua “to rely solely on its own agents for
protection.”105  When the state agency—to the exclusion of law
enforcement, teachers, doctors, and extended family—assumes
responsibility for a child’s physical security and then ignores that
child’s voiceless call for help, as in the prison context, “the State can-
not claim that it did not know a subsequent injury was likely to
occur.”106  Again, the Court referenced the “free world”107 in
DeShaney, but “the freedom our society has to offer Joshua is question-
§ 17a-101g (c), (d) (West 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6362(a) (West 2000); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 417(1)(a), 423 (McKinney 2009).
102 Susan Leviton, the founder of Advocates for Children and Youth and a profes-
sor at the University of Maryland Law School, commented on “voicelessness” regard-
ing Maurice M., the missing infant at the center of Baltimore Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (finding the mother of a missing child could not plead
her Fifth Amendment right not to be a witness against herself in response to a court
order requiring her to produce her abused infant Maurice M. and affirming the con-
sequent contempt order and imprisonment for failing to produce the child), quoted in
Kate Shatzkin, Obscured by Fuss of Bouknight Case Little Boy Lost: The Legal Questions in the
Case of Jacqueline Bouknight Threaten to Obscure the Small Boy Whose Whereabouts She Has
Refused to Reveal for Seven Years, BALT. SUN (Oct. 31, 1995), http://articles.baltimore
sun.com/1995-10-31/news/1995304049_1_bouknight-maurice-voicelessness.
103 Antelava, supra note 5.
104 GELLES, supra note 43, at 53.
105 Analogizing to the prison context in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); GELLES, supra note 43, at 9, 53; see, e.g., N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW §§ 417(1)(a), 423 (McKinney 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101g
(c), (d) (West 1998); see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6362(a) (West 2000) (“Gen-
eral rule. –The county agency shall be the sole civil agency responsible for receiving
and investigating all reports of child abuse . . . .”).
106 Analogizing to Davidson, 474 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(“While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free
world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any
more vulnerable to them.”).
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able at best.”108  Joshua and children like him are not free agents and
are rendered even more vulnerable by the “structure of the law”
itself.109
IV. APPLES AND ORANGES: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS IS NO
PROXY FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Any Fourteenth Amendment claim begins with an analysis of
whether the particular interest at issue is “encompassed within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty or property.’”110
However, procedural and substantive due process claims must be dis-
tinguished.  This distinction matters for two reasons: First, it may
influence the threshold state of mind required to assign liability to
state actors under § 1983, and second, it is relevant to the availability
of a federal remedy.  In cases like DeShaney, it is critical to emphasize
the substantive nature of the claim because only then is a federal
§ 1983 remedy justified for the reckless behavior of a state agent.
Substantive due process § 1983 claims must identify the core lib-
erty—such as the right to procreate,111 the right to privacy,112 consen-
sual sexual activity with another adult,113 or the right to bear children
or not114—violated by a state actor.  In the case of abused children,
the liberty at stake is the right to life and bodily integrity.  Procedural
due process claims, on the other hand, are “fundamentally differ-
ent.”115  In such cases the deprivation “may be entirely legitimate . . .
but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to
provide appropriate procedural safeguards.”116  Unlike the substan-
tive due process claim, in the procedural due process context, the
108 Blumoff, supra note 92, at 110.
109 CURRY, supra note 37, at 139.
110 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977)).
111 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
112 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a state law bar-
ring the use of contraceptives and contraception devices between married
individuals).
113 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (“[O]ur laws and traditions in
the past half century . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”).
114 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
115 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
116 Id.
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deprivation itself may not be an “abuse” of state power, but rather the
deprivation without proper procedure is the violation.117  Thus, a pro-
cedural due process claim must contain a “colorable objection” to the
validity of state procedures.118  Ultimately, a procedural due process
analysis should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all box for substantive due
process claims.
A. A Culpable State of Mind
In Daniels v. Williams119 and Davidson v. Cannon,120 two procedu-
ral due process cases cited in DeShaney,121 the Court held that a state
actor’s negligence was not a deprivation of liberty because “due pro-
cess has never been understood to mean that the State must guaran-
tee due care on the part of its officials.”122  Justice Blackmun
disagreed asserting, “[i]n some cases, by any reasonable standard, gov-
ernmental negligence is an abuse of power.”123  The Court also
“expressly left open the question [in Daniels of] ‘whether something
less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or “gross negli-
gence,” is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process
Clause.’”124 Daniels and Davidson specifically address procedural due
process claims.  In a substantive due process context the minimum
degree of state actor culpability that would trigger § 1983 liability
remains an open question.
Assuming that a special relationship exists between an abused
child and the child welfare agency making monitoring and placement
decisions, a state actor’s deliberate indifference should render him
liable under § 1983 for violating a child’s substantive due process
rights.  County of Sacramento v. Lewis,125 a substantive due process case,
held that a state actor’s conduct must shock the conscience—at least
117 Id. at 338–39.
118 Id.
119 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
120 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (rejecting prisoner’s § 1983 claim even after he was
injured in an attack by another inmate and proved at trial that state officials were
negligent in preventing the assault).
121 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
122 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
123 Id. at 353.
124 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Daniels, 474
U.S. at 334 n.3); see also Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748, 766–68 (2005) (The
Court’s most recent iteration of procedural due process doctrine avoids reaching the
culpability issue by holding that the plaintiff did not have a property interest in the
enforcement of a restraining order—even though police non-enforcement led to the
murder of plaintiff’s three children.).
125 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
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in an emergency situation—to trigger § 1983 liability.126  Circum-
stances are crucial in this analysis, and in foster care situations some
courts have found that deliberate indifference on the part of a state
actor does indeed “shock the conscience.”127  Likewise, in the child
welfare context, a state actor’s deliberate indifference to the child’s
welfare should trigger liability.  Deliberate indifference is akin to crim-
inal recklessness and is appropriately difficult to prove.128  For the
agency to be liable, a child welfare worker would need to proceed with
complete disregard for the probable harmful consequences of her
actions.129
Although deliberate indifference on the part of the social welfare
agency should certainly trigger agency liability, even agency negli-
gence could arguably be enough, for the Fourteenth Amendment is
not “‘trivialize[d]’130 by recognizing that in some situations negli-
gence can lead to a deprivation of liberty.”131  Rather, “excusing the
State’s failure to provide reasonable protection” to known children
against known family violence when they are under the purview of the
child welfare system “demeans both the Fourteenth Amendment and
individual dignity.”132
Even if agency negligence were categorically insufficient to trig-
ger liability, the more-difficult-to-prove deliberate indifference stan-
dard likely would have implicated the social worker in Joshua’s case.
126 Id. at 848.  The “exact degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the ‘con-
science-shocking’ level depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.” Miller v.
City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999); Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 12–15
(suggesting that threshold culpability triggering liability may be lower in non-emer-
gency situations: “[N]egligence and gross negligence are not enough for due process
claims, but deliberate indifference and recklessness are sufficient”).  In his discussion
of state-actor culpability, Chemerinsky conflates procedural due process analysis (as
seen in Daniels and Davidson) with substantive due process analysis (as seen in Lewis),
which is problematic. Compare id. at 11, with supra Part IV discussion. See generally
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV.
307, 325–27 (2010) (arguing the culpability standard should not be so harsh as to
defeat nearly all conceivable § 1983 claims: “[A]ppellate courts have ratcheted up the
. . . standard to impose an almost impenetrable obstacle.”).
127 Miller, 174 F.3d at 375; Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“Indeed, in the foster care context, most of the courts of appeals have applied the
deliberate indifference standard, although they have defined that standard in slightly
different ways.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 13.
128 Albrecht, supra note 68, at 459–60.
129 Id.
130 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
131 Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 356 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
132 Id.
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The social worker’s “deliberate decision not to protect” Joshua from
“a known threat” resulted in his grave injuries.133
B. In the World of Substantive Due Process, State Tort Remedies
Are Beside the Point
As in the context of state actor culpability, substantive due pro-
cess claims must be distinguished from procedural due process claims
in the context of remedies, too.  In DeShaney, the majority opinion
pointed to the existence of state remedies to bolster the holding fore-
closing constitutional remedies.  In the substantive due process con-
text, however, the existence of state remedies is not particularly
relevant to the analysis: “the existence of state remedies has relevance
with regard to some procedural due process claims, but not substan-
tive due process claims.”134  That is, procedural due process claims are
simply different in nature from substantive due process claims.  “Sub-
stantive due process . . . does not focus on the state’s failure to provide
sufficient process.  Rather, it is the raw abuse of power that violates the
Constitution, and such abuse is unaffected by the existence of state
remedies.”135  So even though state tort remedies are theoretically
available to child abuse victims, such remedies do not redress the con-
stitutional violation at issue.  Only a constitutional remedy can do so.
Finally, “[a]s the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress intended
§ 1983 to be ‘liberally and beneficently construed’ so that it might
effectively ‘protect human liberty and human rights.’”136  A “benefi-
cently construed” § 1983 remedy is necessary in the child welfare
context.
133 Analogizing to Davidson, 474 U.S. at 355–56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134 Levinson, supra note 126, at 350.
135 Id. at 324 (emphasis added).  If the claim is a violation of substantive due pro-
cess, “a plaintiff may . . . invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.”
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring); Levinson, supra note 126, at 324.
136 Recent Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1917 (2003) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978)); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961).
“Until or unless § 1983 is repealed or amended, it should not be interpreted contrary
to its historic purpose . . . liability for the arbitrary abuse of power by executive branch
officials should not be relegated to the vagaries of state tort law.”  Levinson, supra
note 126, at 344 & n.212 (noting the “illogic and danger of limiting the substantive
scope of constitutional rights based on the existence of state torts.”).
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V. THE DUE PROCESS SOLUTION
A. A Special Relationship Can Be Established in the
Child Welfare Context
DeShaney’s failure to recognize a special relationship in the child
welfare context creates perverse incentives for child welfare agencies,
incentives that persist today in spite of ASFA.  First, the state has an
incentive to avoid taking abused children into custody, for by doing so
they give rise to liability that they would never have merely monitoring
children in their own abusive homes.  Second, states have no real
incentive to fix their overburdened child welfare agencies because
their workers can conduct cases negligently or even recklessly137 with-
out fear of legal penalties; for although state tort law remedies might
exist in theory, immunity statutes and limits on damages render
abused children without a state remedy in fact.138  Moreover, even
where criminal charges have been brought against child welfare work-
ers, such workers were generally relieved of liability—either in the ini-
tial trial or on appeal.139  In short, DeShaney has created a regime in
which child welfare agencies are allowed to remain both
overburdened and immune.  This must change on a national scale,
and “[t]hreaten[ing] states with the specter of litigation” will inspire
reform.140
137 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 7th Cir.
1987), aff’d., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Elena Kagan, Certiorari Memo written for
Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 3, 1987).
138 This was the case with Joshua. CURRY, supra note 37, at 84 (pointing out that
state tort law capped damages at $50,000—not even enough money to cover one year
of his care).  The state continues to pay the price for Joshua’s abuse, but prevention
would have been better for Joshua and more economically efficient for the state long-
term. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.  Although immunity issues will
persist with any § 1983 claim, this Note is limited to arguing that the fundamental
nature of the right at issue warrants a constitutional cause of action.  Immunity issues
are beyond the scope of the argument.
139 See supra note 4.
140 Mark Levine, The Need for the Special Relationship Doctrine in the Child Protection
Context, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 329, 374 (1990).  Bringing criminal charges against individ-
ual caseworkers as in the cases of Nixzmary Brown and Bradley McGee does much to
deter able persons from entering this field of work, but very little for agency reform,
as the worker alone takes the fall, allowing the agency to continue business as usual.
See Cara Buckley & Mosi Secret, Case Workers Dispirited Over Charges in Girl’s Death, N.Y.
TIMES (March 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/nyregion/25acs.
html (noting also: “The mayor’s proposed budget includes across-the-board cuts, and
should it pass, the child protective services arm of the agency would lose $19 million,
forcing staff cuts and burdening individual caseworkers with more work.”).  Assigning
civil liability to deliberately indifferent social workers, on the other hand, increases
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Furthermore, state agencies preclude private rescuers from inter-
vening in the lives of abused children.141  Local laws encourage citi-
zens to rely on social services agencies and prevent other would-be
rescuers from intervening on the child’s behalf: “[A] private citizen,
or even a person working in a government agency other than [a child
welfare agency] would feel that her job was done as soon as she had
reported her suspicions of child abuse . . . .”142  Again, reporting is not
where the breakdown occurs.  In spite of reporting, nearly seventy
percent of claims go uninvestigated.143  Since “[the government] has
required or encouraged reliance on its own regulatory structure in
numerous areas, including . . . supervision of child welfare . . . it has
stripped citizens of self-help remedies in numerous areas.”144  Thus,
“even if [child welfare agencies] do not explicitly approve or encourage
the likelihood that the agency will see some liability and implement reforms. See, e.g.,
Barber v. State of Florida, 592 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).  Bradley McGee’s
caseworker, who failed to report that his mother forced him to eat feces as punish-
ment for soiling his diaper, was originally convicted of abuse and failure to report
abuse.  On appeal, the court noted “[T]he facts here presented a very close case to
the jury” and sustained only the lesser charge for failure to report. Id. at 335.  The
social worker’s punishment was merely probation.  In part, the court seems to accept
an overburdened agency and too-busy caseworkers as valid excuses for deaths like
Bradley’s.  Furthermore, the confidentiality laws that protect the privacy of those
investigated by child welfare agencies “are also used to hide the work of caseworkers
who ignore the basic tenets of child protection.”  Levine, supra at 374.  Isolated
instances of individual criminal liability will not lead to widespread child welfare
reform.
141 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 205 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that a state’s action can “render[ ] . . . people help-
less to . . . seek help from persons unconnected to the government”).  Brennan
argues: “While other governmental bodies and private persons are largely responsible
for reporting of possible cases of child abuse . . . [e]ven when it is the sheriff’s office
or police department that receives a report of suspected child abuse, that report is
referred to local social services departments for action.” Id. at 208.
142 Id. at 209–10; see also THE UNQUIET DEATH, supra note 1.  In spite of the mater-
nal grandmother’s attempts to intervene and rescue Eli, she was constrained by the
social services agency; the more she reported abuse, the more the agency dismissed
her claims as frivolous.
143 NIS-4, supra note 27, at 8-3–8-4.  “Similar to previous NIS findings, the NIS-4
again determined that the majority of maltreated children do not receive CPS investi-
gation.” Id at 9-3; GELLES, supra note 43, at 88, 154–55 (arguing that the reporting of
abuse is generally not the problem; rather, the rub lies with investigation and action).
144 Milena Shtelmakher, Police Misconduct and Liability: Applying the State-Created
Danger Doctrine to Hold Police Officers Accountable for Responding Inadequately to Domestic-
Violence Situations, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1533, 1556 n.190 (2010) (quoting Susan
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2321–22 (1990)).
This move was motivated by a desire to keep the ballooning and flawed foster care
system in check.  It did so, but at a cost to child welfare.
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private violence, their repeated, sustained inaction can communicate
that they will not interfere in the violence.”145  And abusers are likely
aware of understaffed and inadequate child protective services.
The policy fear animating the DeShaney opinion is a concern that
the Fourteenth Amendment is at risk of becoming a “font of tort
law.”146  But, recognizing that state-monitored child abuse victims are
in a special relationship with child welfare workers would not result in
the sort of font of tort law147 problems with which the DeShaney court
was concerned. Unlike the state-created danger exception—the world
of plaintiffs here is limited to child abuse victims, for this special rela-
tionship regime would not extend to adult domestic violence victims
who can leave, take shelter physically, and gain the legal shelter of a
restraining order.  Moreover, requiring plaintiffs to prove the “delib-
erate indifference” of the child welfare worker makes these claims very
difficult to win and gives the state actor “a distinct courtroom
advantage.”148
Congressional action and Justice Rehnquist’s ersatz state-tort-law
remedy have not solved the DeShaney problem, and children’s due pro-
cess rights are too important to leave to the whims of state legislators.
“[A] deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from
and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute
both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right.”149  The
very purpose of § 1983 was “to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy . . . was not available in practice.”150  Thus, the right way
to motivate state child welfare agencies to act reasonably is to impose
liability for failures.
Finally, substantive due process “serves a nationalizing function”
because “[w]hen the Court recognizes substantive due process rights,
145 This is an analogy to Shtelmakher’s argument regarding police officers. See
Shtelmakher, supra note 144, at 1554 (emphasis added).
146 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 863–64 (1998) (citing Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 332 (1986)).  “[T]he concern cited by the Court to justify a more
stringent standard . . .—fear of converting § 1983 substantive due process claims into
a ‘font of tort law’—is unfounded and exaggerated.” Id. at 846–48; Levinson, supra
note 126, at 308.
147 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
148 Smith, supra note 58, at 507.
149 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).  “The over-
lap with state tort remedies should not determine the fate of federal constitutional
violations.” Levinson, supra note 126, at 343.  It is no answer that the state has a law
which if enforced would give relief.
150 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
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they are national rights that every state and locality must honor.”151
Supreme Court recognition of an abused child’s substantive due pro-
cess right to be reasonably rescued by the state’s child welfare agency
would lead to national reform.  Under the current no-duty regime,
states vary widely in their efforts and policies, and abused children
fare better in some states than in others.152
B. Fashioning a Narrow Due Process Remedy
The abused child’s right to be reasonably rescued by the child
welfare agency involved is viable only in this narrow context of state
agency supervision.  Although some scholars and judges cite a consti-
tution of “negative rather than positive liberties,”153 many others rec-
ognize that the DeShaney Court’s line-drawing between state action
and inaction is not sustainable.154  The state’s intervention in the fam-
ily, the particular voicelessness of these victims, and the fundamental,
core rights at issue—the child’s basic rights to life and liberty—
require that a corresponding state agency duty be recognized.
The elements of an abused child’s claim should include (1) a sub-
stantiated report of child abuse, (2) child welfare agency intervention
in the family, (3) a welfare worker keeping that child in or returning
151 Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 94
(2006).
152 Antelava, supra note 5.
153 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 7th Cir.
1987), aff’d., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
154 Bandes, supra note 144, at 2279–85; Matthew D. Barrett, Failing to Provide Police
Protection: Breeding a Viable and Consistent ‘State-Created Danger’ Analysis for Establishing
Constitutional Violations Under Section 1983, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 177, 229–30 (2002)
(“[I]ntentional inaction by a state can be just as abusive and oppressive. . . . [T]he
action-inaction distinction is a classic example of a distinction without a difference.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 25–26; Oren, supra note 83, at 53 (“[T]he line
between action and inaction can often be in the eyes of the beholder . . . .”);
Shtelmakher, supra note 144, at 1538 (“[T]he standard . . . should not focus on the
distinction between an action and an omission.”). But see Jeremy Daniel Kernodle,
Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the State-Created Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 187–89 (2001) (outlin-
ing a three-element analysis for satisfying the “affirmative action requirement”
because “inaction simply does not state a valid claim”). See generally W. KEETON, PROS-
SER & KEETON ON TORTS § 56, at 374 (5th ed.1984) (“Failure to blow a whistle or to
shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is readily treated as negligent operation of
a train, which is affirmative misconduct; an omission to repair a gas pipe is regarded
as negligent distribution of gas; and failure to supply heat for a building can easily
become mismanagement of a boiler.”); Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmen-
tal Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107
(1991) (critiquing the sustainability of the action/inaction distinction).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 32 31-JAN-13 12:51
554 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
her to the abusive home, and (4) the child’s serious, permanent injury
or death from abuse.  If these elements are met, the child should have
a prima facie § 1983 claim that her Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess right to be reasonably rescued was violated.  Of course to win a
§ 1983 claim in court, the child would further need to prove the at
least the deliberate indifference of the state actor and overcome the
state agency’s robust sovereign and qualified immunity protections.155
Although recognizing a constitutional right may seem radical, it
is precisely what several circuits did in pre-DeShaney forays into this
area of law.156  And, the DeShaney framework with its special relation-
ship exception is well-suited to this task.  Certainly, these rights
remain highly contested.157  However, even recognizing the contro-
versial nature of establishing a constitutional right in the child welfare
context, radical does not mean bad or unwarranted.  In fact, radical
may well mean necessary and appropriate.  The Court has before
carved out special constitutional rules to protect the interests of child
abuse victims.158  It should do so again.  As Justice Blackmun notes in
his DeShaney dissent, “Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to
fugitive slaves, the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh,
is compelled by existing legal doctrine.  On the contrary . . . our Four-
teenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly
depending upon how one chooses to read them. . . . [A]nd I would
adopt a . . . reading . . . which comports with the dictates of funda-
mental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled
from the province of judging.”159
CONCLUSION
Before DeShaney, circuit courts were starting to provide a constitu-
tional remedy for abused children under state care.  Congress, too,
sought to provide a statutory remedy for child abuse victims. DeShaney
halted such progress.160  Long ago, a congressional committee report
155 See supra note 8 & Part IV discussion.
156 See supra note 73 & Part III discussion.
157 Conkle, supra note 151, at 64 (“Nothing in constitutional law is more contro-
versial than substantive due process.”).
158 See supra note 14.
159 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212–13
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160 As now Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan warned so long ago: “This issue is
important, and there is a circuit split. I only worry that a majority of this Court will
agree with Judge Posner that ‘the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties’ and will thereby preclude the approach taken by the [Third] and
[Fourth Circuits].” Elena Kagan, Certiorari Memo written for Thurgood Marshall
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asserted that “[a]ll Americans share an ethical duty to ensure the
safety of children”161 and that the “[p]rotection of children from
harm is not just an ethical duty—it is a matter of national survival.”162
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment has much to say about the way child
welfare agencies deal with children, prompting a capacious view of
liberty and reasonable rescue for children under state agency care.
(Sept. 3, 1987);  Linda Greenhouse, A Second Chance for Joshua, N.Y. TIMES (June
17, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/a-second-chance-for-
joshua/ (“Elena Kagan [is] the youngest justice, with a long prospective tenure. She
saw around one corner in her initial encounter with the DeShaney case. She will inevi-
tably have other chances in the coming decades and maybe, with her help . . . the
court will get it right.”).
161 ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 31, at 4 (“The nation recognizes and enforces
children’s dependency upon adults.  In such a context, Americans should ensure, at a
minimum, that children are protected from harm.” (emphasis added)).
162 Id.
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